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A Solution to the Problem of Externalities and Public Goods
when Agents are Well-Informed.
Hal R. Varian
Consider an economic environment in which some agents may take actions which impose
benefits or costs on other agents. All agents are aware of the relevant technology and
the tastes of all other agents. However the "regulator," who has the responsibility for
determining the final allocation, does not have this information. How can the regulator
design a mechanism so that the agents will have the proper incentives to reveal their
information and achieve an efficient allocation?
In addition to implementing an efficient allocation, one might also want the mechanism
to achieve some distributional goals. For example, one might want agents who are injured
by an externality to be compensated for that injury. Or, in the case of public goods, one
might want the public goods to be paid for by a system of Lindahl taxes.
In this paper I describe a simple two-stage game that implements efficient allocations
in this sort of environment. The mechanism also achieves the distributional goals just
described. In the subgame perfect equilibria of this game, parties injured by the externality
are compensated and in the case of public goods, the mechanism implements Lindahl
allocations. The mechanism appears to work in a broad variety of economic environments
and does not involve substantial restrictions on tastes or technology. In addition, the
mechanism is very simple to describe and analyze.
The fact that sequential games and subgame perfect equilibria may be very useful in
implementation problems was first suggested by Moore and Repullo (1988). They show
that in economic environments, almost any choice rule can be implemented by subgame
perfect equilibria. However, as Moore and Repullo point out, "...the mechanisms we con-
struct ... are far from simple; agents move simultaneously at each stage and their strategy
This work was supported by National Science Foundation grant SES-8800114. I wish to thank Mark
Bagnoli, Ted Bergstrom, Ken Binmore, Arthur Robson, and Michael Whinston for their comments and
suggestions.
1
sets are unconvincingly rich. We present such mechanisms to show what is possible, not
what is realistic." (p. 1198)
However, Moore and Repullo also show that in certain "economic environments" it is
possible to use somewhat simpler mechanisms. I pursue this idea and construct mechanisms
that appear to be quite simple and practical for the sorts of the externality problems of
interest to economists.
It should be emphasized that these mechanisms only work in the case where the agents
are perfectly informed about the technology and tastes of the other agents. This is, of
course, more restrictive than one would like. However, there is a broad set of cases for
which such mechanisms may be useful. For example, consider a set of agents who must
design a mechanism to make group decisions in situations that will arise in the future.
At the time the mechanism is chosen, the agents do not know the relevant tastes and
technologies, but they will know these things when the mechanism is actually used.
This latter example is sometimes known as a "constitutional choice" problem: we
must choose a decision-making procedure without knowing much about the tastes and
technologies available to the agents who will use the procedure. However, we do know
that the agents who will actually use the procedure will be reasonably well-informed about
these matters when the decision must be made. I suggest that the mechanism described
below may be useful for such problems.
In section 1 I describe a very simple example of the mechanism in a two-firm exter-
nalities problem and discuss in an intuitive way why the method works. The following
sections show how the method can be extended to work in more general environments.
Next, I describe a generalization of the mechanism which implements Lindahl allocations
in a standard public goods problem. Finally, I show how the method may be used to solve
very general problems in resource allocation.
L An example of the mechanism
Consider the following externality problem involving two firms. Firm 1 produces output x
in order to maximize its profit
ri= rz - c(x).
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Here r is the competitive price of output and the cost function c(x) is a differentiable,
positive, increasing, and convex function.
We assume that firm 1's choice of output imposes an externality on firm 2. For any
choice of x, firm 2's profits are
r2 = -e(x),
where e(x) is a differentiable, positive, increasing, and convex function of x. All of this
information is common knowledge among the agents, but is not known to the regulator.
One class of solutions to this externality problem involves re-assigning the property
rights. For example, one firm could buy out the other, internalize the externality, and
eliminate the inefficiency. Another class of solutions involves negotiation between the
agents with respect to the externality. A third class of solutions involves intervention by
a regulator who imposes a Pigouvian tax.
We will assume that the property rights are fixed, so that one firm cannot buy out
the other or move away from the externality. Hence "property rights" solutions to the
externality are not available and some type of negotiation between the firms or intervention
by the regulator is necessary to encourage efficient outcomes.
If the regulator had full information the problem would be easy. One solution would
be for the regualtor to impose the costs of the externality on firm 1 by charging it a "tax"
of e(x) if it produces x units of output. Firm 1 would then solve the problem
max rx - c(x) - e(x).
Let x* be solution to this problem; then x* satisfies the first-order condition
r - c'(x*) - e'(x*) = 0.
Given our curvature assumptions on e(x), we could just as well set a "Pigouvian tax,"
p*= e'(x*) and let firm 1 solve the problem
max rx -c(x) -p*x.
However, we have assumed that the regulator doesn't know the size of the externality
and therefore cannot determine p*. The regulator's problem is to design a mechanism that
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will induce the agents to reveal their information about the magnitude of the externality
and achieve an effient level of production.
Here is a mechanism that solves the regulator's problem.
Announcement stage. Firm 1 and firm 2 simultaneously announce the magnitude of the
appropriate Pigouvian tax; denote the announcement of firm 1 by pi and the announcement
of firm 2 by p2.
Production stage. Firm 1 chooses x to maximize the following payoff
111 = px -c(x)-p 2x-a1(p1 -P2)2.
Firm 2 receives a payoff of
I12 = p1x - e(x) - a 2 (p 2 - P1)2 .
The parameters a1 and a 2 are arbitrary positive numbers.
In this mechanism firm 1 is forced to pay a penalty based on the marginal social cost
of the externality as reported by firm 2, and firm 2 receives compensation based on the
marginal social cost as reported by firm 1. Each firm must also pay a penalty based on
the square of the difference between the two reports. This penalty can be any increasing
function of difference between the two reports, but we have chosen a quadratic penalty for
simplicity. Since the a's can be arbitrary positive constant, the penalties can be arbitrarily
small.
Analysis of the mechanism
There are many Nash equilibria of this game; essentially any triple (pi , p2, x) such that
P1 = P2 and x maximizes firm 1's objective function is a Nash equilibrium. However, if
we use the stronger concept of subgame perfect equilibrium we get a much smaller set of
equilibria. In fact, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game has each agent
reporting P1 = P2 = p* and firm 1 producing the efficient amount of output.
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In order to verify this, we must work backwards through the game. We begin with the
production stage. Firm 1 maximizes its profits, given the reports generated in stage 1,
which implies that firm 1 will choose x to satisfy the first-order condition
r = c'(x) +P2-
This determines the optimal choice, x, as a function of P2, which we denote by x(p2). Note
that x'(p2 ) < 0-the higher the cost that firm 2 announces, the less firm 1 will want to
produce.
We now examine the price-setting stage of the game. Consider first firm 1. If firm 1
believes that firm 2 will announce p2, then firm 1 will want to announce pi = P2. This is
clear since pi has no effect on firm 1's payoff except through the quadratic penalty.
Consider now firm 2's decision. Although firm 2's announcement has no direct effect
on firm 2's profits, it does have an indirect effect through the influence of P2 on firm 1's
output choice in stage 2. Differentiating the profit function of firm 2 with respect to p2,
we have
II2(p2) = [P1 - e'(x)]x'(p2) - 2a2(p2 - p1). (1)
We have seen that pi = P2 in equilibrium. Hence if firm 2 is at an interior equilibrium we
must have p1 = e'(x).
The second derivative of firm 2's profit is
I2(p2) = [pi - e'(x)]x"(p2) - x'(p2)
2 e"(x) - 2a 2 < 0.
Here we have used the fact that pi = e'(x) and x'(p2 ) < 0. Hence the second-order
condition must be satisfied at any interior solution.
If pi = e'(x), then the first order condition for production is
r = c'(x) + e'(x),
which is simply the condition for social optimality. Hence, the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium to this game involves firm 1 producing the socially optimal amount of the
externality. Note that this is a strict equilibrium in the sense that each firm's maximization
problem achives a strict maximum at this equilibrium.
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The only thing remaining to check is that there are no boundary solutions. Suppose
that p can range between zero and p. Since p1 = P2 in any equilibrium, the derivative of
firm 2's profit at p2 = 0 is
I72(0) = -e'(x)x'(0) > 0.
Similarly, at p2 = p, we have
If p is larger than the largest possible marginal externality cost, this derivative will certainly
be negative.
Note that in this mechanism, firm 2 is compensated for the externality. Since the
externality cost function is convex, firm 2 in fact is overcompensated for the externality, in
the sense that the amount of money it collects exceeds the cost of the externality.
2. Discussion of the example
The intuition behind the mechanism is not particularly difficult. In the first stage each
firm announces the (marginal) cost of the externality: firm 1 announces a cost that will
be used to compensate firm 2, and firm 2 announces a cost that will be used to tax firm 1.
It is more or less obvious that firm 1 will never want to say the externality is not as
costly as it really is, since then firna 2 will then want to set a large tax for firm 1 so as to
make the level of production as small as possible. This will certainly harm firm 1.
Will firm 1 will ever want to overstate the cost of the externality by announcing that
the externality is larger than it really is? If it does, the firm 2 will be overcompensated
on the znargin and will want set p2 = 0 so that firm 1 will produce as much output as
possible. But then firm 1 will have to pay a penalty based on the difference between their
two reports. Hence firm 1 can only lose by exaggerating the size of the externality.
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Collusion
We have seen that each firm independently has an incentive to reveal the truth in equilib-
rium. Furthermore, in equilibrium the government's budget balances in the sense that the
compensation paid to firm 2 is just equal to the tax paid by firm 1. But out of equilibrium
the budget will not necessarily balance. Is it possible that the two firms can collude in
some way so as to exploit the regulator?
The sum of the profits of the two firms using the mechanism is:
(r + Pi - P2 )x - c(x) - e(x) -(a1 + a2)(P1 - P2) 2 . (2)
Ignore the quadratic penalty term in (2) for the moment. Then without this term, the
firms would like to set pi = i and p2 = 0. That is, firm 1 would want to exaggerate the
magnitude of the externality in order to encourage the regulator to pay a large compensa-
tion to firm 2. But if firm 2 gets overcompensated for the externality, it wants to report
P2 = 0 so as to encourage firm 1 to produce as much as possible.
However, this strategy involves making highly divergent reports. Can we use the
penalty term to discourage such collusion?
The quadratic penalty is not very good for this purpose since it has a derivative of zero
when pi = P2. However an absolute value penalty works reasonably well. To see this, let
the penalty term be given by ca;pi - P21. If we choose a2 = 0 the proof given earlier goes
through: Pi = P2 is still the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
Suppose that we consider increasing pi and decreasing P2. Then the profits of the firm
increase by x, and the penalty increases by &i. Certainly for large enough values of a1
this will not be a profitable move for the coalition.
Strict equilibria and information costs
We have assumed that each firm has full information. It is natural to suppose that firm 2
knows the cost of the externality, but firm 1 may not know the magnitude of the costs it
imposes, at least with certainty. However, let us suppose that firm 1 may learn the size of
the externality by incurring some costs. The question is, will firm 1 have proper incentives
to actually make this investment?
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Without modeling the information acquisition in detail we cannot give a precise answer
to this question. However, roughly speaking, it appears that the answer is yes. Since the
efficient output is a strict equilibrium, firm 1 incurs a penalty if it announces p1 # P2. The
size of this penalty depends on the magnitude of the a1. The larger the value of a1 the
more incentive firm 1 has to match firm 2's announcement. Hence, firm 2 does have an
incentive to invest in information acquisition.
Income effects
The above example used payoff functions that are linear in money, so that the objective
functions of the agents are quasilinear utility functions. This is reasonable in the case of
firm behavior, but somewhat restrictive in the case of externalities involving consumers.
However, the mechanism can easily be generalized to include income effects. Since
this is a special case of the public goods problem and general resource allocation problem
presented later, we defer the argument until we treat those topics.
3. Relation to the literature
There is a broad literature that is concerned with the design of games to implement
desired allocations. See Laffont and Maskin (1982) and Maskin (1985) for overviews of
this literature. There are three crucial aspects in the mechanism described above: first,
that agents report on the type of other agents, second, that there is a penalty based on
the difference in the reports, and third, that we use subgame perfection as an equilibrium
concept.
Each of these features has appeared in other mechanisms available in the literature,
but, to my knowledge, they have never been used together in the same way that I use them.
For example, Matsushima (1988) and Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) describe mechanism
where agents report on each others type. Each of these mechanisms involves penalties
when the types are different.
Moore and Repullo (1989) use all three devices in their basic mechanism, but the
mechanism is very complex. It is however, designed for more general problems than simply




The externality described above is a very simple one: there are only two agents involved.
It might be supposed that if property rights can be freely transferred, or other sort of
negotiations can be undertaken, then it would be possible to internalize simple two-party
externalities of this sort. The vast literature on the Coase theorem discusses this point in
detail.
But problems involving several agents are not so easily dismissed. If the externality
is a public good, then transferring property rights may be difficult or impossible. And
totally unstructured negotiations may be very complex or costly to implement. However,
a generalization of our mechanism may still be used effectively. We loosely describe the
mechanism here, and give a more detailed description in the next section.
In the case of public goods, the relevant parameter for describing the tastes of an agent
is simply his Lindahl price-his marginal rate of substitution at a particular Pareto efficient
allocation. In stage 1 of our game, each agent i will simultaneously announce a "price of
the public good," pij, for each other agent j. The "price" that agent j will actually face
is the average of the prices chosen for him by the other agents.
In the second stage of the game, each agent j determines how much he wants to
contribute to the public good based on his personalized price determined in the first stage
of the game. The amount that each agent has to pay for his contribution will depend on
his own contribution and on the total contributions by the other agents.
Agents recognize in the first stage that the prices that they set will influence the Nash
equilibrium of the contribution game in the second stage. We will show that in the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium, each agent will announce a set of Lindahl prices, and the
contributions in the second stage will comprise the associated Lindahl allocation!
5. A simple mechanism for the public goods problem
There are n agents and two goods, a private good, x;i, and a public good, G. Agent i has
a differentiable quasiconcave utility function u,(G, x;) and initial wealth w,. We assume
that the demand function for the public good is a differentiable function of its price; see
the appendix for discussion of this point.
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A unit of the private good can be transformed into a unit of the public good on a
one-for-one basis. Hence if each agent j sacrifices g, of the private good, the utility of
agent i will be u (En_ 1 gj, w= - gi). This is not a serious restriction on the technology that
generates the public good. If G is produced from the private good by a concave production
function h(x), then the utility function of agent i is u=(h(E 1 gj), w, - g;), which simply
involves reinterpreting the original utility function.
A Lindahl allocation for this problem is a set of personalized prices (p=) for the public
good, such that the amount of the public good that each consumer i demands at his
personalized price is equal to a Pareto efficient amount of the public good. Since a Pareto
efficient amount of the public good satisfies the Samuelson condition that the sum of the
marginal rates of substitution equals the marginal cost, we must have E"1 pi = 1.
Our mechanism for solving this public goods problem consists of two stages.
The price setting stage. Each agent i announces n - 1 numbers pij for all j # i. The
personalized price facing agent j is the average of the numbers named by the other agents:
1
Let p denote the vector of prices (p 1,.. ., pu).
The contribution stage. Each agent i chooses a nonnegative amount gi to contribute to
the public good. If the total amount of contributions equals G, then agent i must pay an
amount pG + Q(p), where Q(p) = a(Z" 1 pi - 1)2 and a is an arbitrary (small) positive
constant.
I claim that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game will be a Lindahl
allocation.
It is easy to show that the Lindahl allocation is an equilibrium of this game. To do
this we only need to show that if every other agent announces the Lindahl prices, agent i
can not increase his utility by announcing some other set of prices.
To prove this we first observe that since the Lindahi prices generate an efficient amount
of the public good, Ge, since >3" pe = 1. Hence, Q(p) = a(Z, pl 1)2 - 0. Suppose
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that agent i, say, announces some numbers that change the price vector pe to p' and that
this change results in some possibly different amount of the public good, G'. Note that
the price facing agent i does not change since agent i can only affect the prices facing the
other agents.
We have
ui(Ge, wi - piGe) ui(G', wi - piG') > ui(G', wi - piG' - Q(p')).
The first inequality arises from the fact that we start with a Lindahl allocation so that
agent i's demand for the public good at his personalized price is the actual amount of the
public good. The second inequality arises from the fact that Q(p') > 0. This shows that
agent i is at least as well off announcing numbers that lead to the Lindahl prices (p ) as
any other numbers.
The proof that there are no other subgame perfect equilibria to the game is somewhat
more complicated and is given in the next section. However, it is worthwhile giving an
intuitive argument here to get a feel for the mechanism. In order to do this we make the
strong assumption that each agent contributes a positive amount in the second stage of
the game. This will not generally be true, and dealing with this difficulty is what generates
the complications in the formal proof given below.
Let pi be an arbitrary set of prices that do not sum to 1. In the first stage of the game
agent i gets to influence agent j's price, p3 . We will show that agent i can change pj in a
way that will increase agent i's utility.
The derivative of agent i's utility with respect to p, is
oui oui oG oui 8G*




and we are left with
-- 2a )p-1#0
(9; a p; axi (.p (j=1
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Hence agent i can always change p; in a way that will increase his utility. This completes
the informal argument.
This argument shows in an intuitive way why the mechanism works. However, it is not
a rigorous argument. The main problem is that in general we will not have an interior
equilibrium in the contribution stage of the game. For arbitrary prices, it will typically
be in the interest of some of the agents to free ride and contribute zero. However, this
problem in the above argument can be patched up; there will always be some agent who
makes a positive contribution to the public good and we only need show that he has an
incentive to change his behavior if we are not at a Lindahl allocation.
In Varian (1989) I describe a related, but much simpler, mechanism that implements a
Lindahi allocation in the case of quasilinear utility and two agents. In stage 1 each agent
announces the rate at which they will subsidize the contributions of the other agent. In
stage 2 each agent makes a contribution, paying for his own contribution at the subsidized
rate, and paying the subsidy promised to the other agent. I show that the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium to this game is the Lindahl allocation. Note that no penalty term is
required in the case of two agents.
6. The proof that the mechanism works
We make the following assumptions about the agent's utility functions.
Assumption. The utility function u,(G, xi) is a differentiable, quasiconcave function that
is increasing in both arguments. The marginal-rate-of-substitution function, defined by
m=(G,xi) = /9G,
is infinite when G = 0.
This assumption ensures that some agent will always want to contribute in the contri-
bution stage, regardless of the prices set by the other agents. It can be relaxed significantly,
but at the cost of complicating the argument.
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The contribution stage
We begin by analyzing the second stage of the game. Given arbitrary prices pi > 0, and
arbitrary contributions by the other agents, Gi = i; gj, agent i wants to solve the
problem
max ui(G - +gi,xi)
Xz;,g;
such that xi + pigi = wi - p=G-= - Q(p)
gi 0.
In interpreting the budget constraint, remember that each agent must pay an amount that
depends on the sum of the contributions by the other agents, p;G _;, as well as a quadratic
penalty Q(p) depending on the announced prices.
If we add G-; to both sides of these constraints and use the definition G = G_= + gi
we can rewrite this problem as
max u,(G, xi)
xi,G
such that xi + p;G = wi - Q(p)
G > G-1.
This is just like a standard two-good consumer maximization problem except for the in-
equality constraint. Although each agent i only gets to choose the level of his contribution
gi, he is effectively choosing level of the public good, since agent i can choose to contribute
zero and get G-; or to contribute a positive amount and get his preferred amount.
Let Gm be the maximum amount of the public good demanded by any of the agents at
the prices (pi). Then I claim that Gm must be the Nash equilibrium amount of the public
good. To prove this, simply note that Gm must solve each individual's utility maximization
problem.
Note that the pattern of contributions among the agents who prefer to contribute Gm
is arbitrary. To see this, suppose that agents i and j want the same amount of the public
good, Gm, and that they are the only two agents making contributions to the public good.
Let g; and gi denote these contributions; of course, g, + g, = Gm. However, i's total
payment is pjgj +pG-.. = pj(g + gj) = piGm. Similarly agent j's total payment is pjGm.
It follows that any reallocation of the contributions between i and j does not affect
their total payments, which only depend on Gm and their personalized prices.
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This has an important consequence which we will use below. If each individual's de-
mand for the public good is a differentiable function of the price he faces, then the equi-
librium amount of the public good will be left-differentiable function of the price faced by
any contributor.
To see this, observe that there is no difficulty with differentiability when only one agent
is contributing to the public good. The only difficulties arise when two or more agents each
contribute. But we have just seen that when two agents contribute, they are indifferent
about reallocations of the contributions between them-since the amount that they have
to pay is independent of such reallocations. Suppose that we have an equilibrium in which
agents i and j are both contributing. If we increase p= a little bit, then agent i will want
to stop contributing and free-ride on agent j. However, agent j will want to increase his
contribution by exactly the amount that i was contributing. Hence the same amount of
the public good will be provided, and the same payments will be made by each agent.
Suppose that we decrease pi a little bit. Then agent i will want to increase his contri-
bution to the public good by a small amount, and agent j will no longer contribute. Since
we have assumed that agent i's demand for the public good is a differentiable function of
the price he faces, the equilibrium amount of the public good will only change by a small
amount.
The price-setting stage
Consider now the price-setting stage of the game. We have already seen that each agent
naming the Lindahl prices (pi) is a Nash equilibrium.1
So we only need to show that at any price vector other than the Lindahl prices, some
agent can increase his utility. Let (pi) the the set of prices that result from the announce-
ments (p',) and let G* be the Nash equilibrium amount of the public good in the second
stage of the mechanism. We have to investigate three possibles cases.
Case 1. E" * > 1.
1 More precisely, if each agent i names prices pij such that -- jE p~i = pf, then this is an equi-
librium choice. All that matters is that the numbers pu named by the agents average out to the Lindahi
prices. A small penalty based, say, on the variance of the pig's would eliminate this degeneracy.
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We have seen that at least one agent i must be contributing to the public good. Suppose
that he changes his p= for some other agent j in such a way that the price facing agent j
decreases by a small amount dpi. This results in some change in the amount of the public
good in the second stage dG, which may be zero.
The impact of this change on agent i's utility is
du2 = -dG-- pidG+ 2a p - 1 dp,.
aG 8xi (=
We can write this expression as
on- au- oaui
du = L- - pi dG -2a (p-1dpi.14G ax i (9Zi
k=1
Since agent i is contributing a positive amount in the contribution stage of the game the
bracketed expression vanishes, leaving us with
dui = -2a >p -1dpi >0.
8xZ
k=1
The inequality is due to the fact that dp) is negative and all other terms are positive.
Hence a small decrease in pj must increase agent i's utility.
Case 2. Z_-1 p < 1.
Again, let i be an agent who is making a positive contribution, and now let him increase
agent j's price by dp,. Let dG be the associated change in the equilibrium amount of the
public good. Repeating the argument given for case 1, we are left with
dui = -2a- _ -P1)dpJ>0.
Coxi (k=1
Case 3. E"_1 p*4 = 1.
Suppose first that everyone is contributing to the public good in the contribution stage
of the game. Then the equilibrium amount of the public good, CG*, must satisfy the n
first-order conditions
m * ) p
Summing these conditions gives us
Zm(G*,x) = 1.
i=1
But these are the conditions that characterize the Lindahl allocation, in which case were
are done.
We are left with the case where some agent i is not contributing to the public good. If
agent i is just on the verge of contributing, so that mi(G*,xi) = p' the argument given
above applies, so we may assume that mi(G*,4X) < pi.
Let agent i choose announcements (Pu) such that the price for each agent j who is
contributing to the public good increases by a small amount and thus the equilibrium level
of the public good decreases by a small amount dG. The resulting change in utility for
agent i is
[8u, au
du,- [ - pi dG>O.
BG Dz;
The inequality is due to the fact that the bracketed expression is negative since mi(G*, Xz) <
pi and dG is negative by construction. Hence agent i can increase his utility by such a
move.
This completes the argument: at any prices other than the Lindahl prices, there is
some agent i that can increase his utility by naming different prices.
7. Related literature
There is a large literature on mechanisms that "solve the public goods problem." A
solution generally means that one can exhibit a mechanism which has Nash equilibria that
are efficient allocations. This literature up until 1979 is nicely surveyed by Groves (1979).
Clarke (1971) and Groves (1976) examine the public goods problem when all agents
have quasilinear utility functions and exhibit a mechanism for which the dominant strategy
of each agent is to report his true valuation of the public good. However, the resulting
allocation is not in general Pareto efficient.
Groves and Ledyard (1977) present a game whose Nash equilibria are Pareto efficient
but not Lindahl allocations. Hurwicz (1979) and Walker (1981) have described garnes
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whose Nash equilibria are Lindahl allocations. The Hurwicz (1979) mechanism is in much
the same spirit as our mechanism in that agents announce "prices" that in equilibrium
turn out to be Lindahl prices. However, in the Hurwicz mechanism, each agent announces
his own Lindahl price, not that of the other agents.
Moore and Repullo (1988) describe a mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria
implement an arbitrary choice correspondence-including the Lindahl correspondence.
Moore and Repullo describe their construction in the case of quasilinear preferences, but
indicate that it can be used for more general preferences.
In the Moore and Repullo mechanism, one agent announces his type and an other agent
can challenge. If the second agent challenges, then we move to a subgame where agent 1
must choose between two allocations. The allocations in the subgame are chosen so that
both agents will have an incentive to be truthful in the announcement and challenge stages.
This scheme has the advantage that it will work in very general environments. However,
it has the disadvantage that one needs to specify the payoffs in advance for all the possible
subgames. Although payoffs that satisfy the appropriate conditions will exist under general
conditions, it may be quite complicated to actually specify them. In our mechanism, by
contrast, the payoffs are very simple to specify.
8. A general treatment
We now consider a general treatment of the method. Suppose that there are n agents. Let
x denote an allocation of k goods to the n agents. Each agent has a utility function defined
over allocations denoted by u2(x). Since the utility functions are defined over allocations
of the goods, each individual's utility can depend in an arbitrary way on other individual's
consumption.
Let p, be an nk-vector of personalized prices for agent i. Let x* be an efficient allocation.
We assume that the allocations x* can be decentralized by a set of personalized prices, pl
in the sense that x*~ is the solution to each agent's maximization problem
max u;(x)
such that p'x _< pi;
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Here wi is agent i's initial endowment of goods. This assumption essentially requires that
preferences be convex.
Given any set of personalized prices (pi), denote the solution to agent i's maximization
problem (3) by xi. Note that xi is an allocation, not a consumption bundle. For simplicity,
assume that xi is unique.
For an arbitrary set of personalized prices, the set of proposed allocations will not
necessarily be feasible. Even if everyone proposes the same feasible alloction, it will not
necessarily be efficient. Let F(p) denote a measure of how far the allocations fail to be
feasible, and let E(p) denote a measure of by how much the allocation fails to be efficient.
These functions should be differentiable, nonnegative functions that equal zero if and only
if the allocations are feasible or efficient, respectively, and are positive otherwise. The
quadratic forms used earlier are a natural choice.
We can now state the appropriate mechanism to solve our resource allocation problem.
Announcement stage. Each agent i announces a personalized price vector pig for each
other agent j. The price announcements are averaged to construct the personalized prices
facing agent j.
Consumption stage. Each agent chooses xi to maximize his utility, given his personal-
ized prices pi. However, each agent must also pay a penalty of a[E(p) + F(p)] where p is
the vector of all of the personalized prices and a is a strictly positive number.
Hence agent i's maximization problem is:
max u;(x)
X (4)
such that ptx < pi; - c[E(p) + F(p)].
I claim that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is an efficient allocation.
The proof is a simple variation on the earlier arguments. Let x* be an efficient allo-
cation. Then, by hypothesis, this allocation is supported by a set of personalized prices
(p'). At the equilibrium set of (pr) the penalty term E(p*) + F(p*) equals zero. Changing
his price announcements for the other agents doesn't affect agent i's price, and can only
increase the value of the penalty term. Hence (pi', x*) is a subgame perfect equilibrium for
the game.
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Consider any other set of prices that do not minimize E(p) + F(p). Then every agent
has the incentive to adjust his price announcement in a way that decreases the value of
this penalty term. Hence, no other set of prices can be an equilibrium of the game. This
completes the argument.
Discussion of the general result
The logic behind the general mechanism is simple: we express our desired allocation as
the zero of some penalty function, and then give each agent an incentive to minimize that
penalty function. Stated in this way, the result is trivial. However, as we have seen earlier,
this general principle can be tailored to specific resource allocation problems in a way that
makes the mechanism much more useful.
For example, in the case of a simple externality discussed earlier, one firm controls the
level of the externality directly. In this case there is no problem with feasibility, and we
only need to ensure that the efficiency condition is met; i.e., that the marginal cost of the
externality be equated across the firms.
In the case of the public goods problem, we can use the idea of a Lindahl allocation
to ensure that the feasibility condition is automatically satisfied. I expect that this can
be done in a large number of cases when the resource allocation problem has sufficient
structure.
9. Summary
We have exhibited a class of mechanisms that implement efficient outcomes in classical
environments involving externalities and public goods. Several questions remain for future
research. Of course, it would be nice to have a mechanism that works when each agent
only knows his own type. However, it seems unlikely that such a mechanism exists.
First, it would be nice to have a simple mechanism for the public goods case that does
not require simultaneous moves. Second, it would be nice to find a mechanism that works
when agents have incomplete information about the types of the other agents. Third,
it would be useful to examine applications of this method to other problems of resource
allocation. Finally, it would be very interesting to see how well this mechanism performs
in real life. I suspect that some progress will be possible on each of these fronts.
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